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There has been quite a flow of euros 
and dollars earmarked for non-gov-
ernmental organizations south of the 
Mediterranean over the past decade 
and a half, and many hundreds of coop-
erative ventures between Atlantic and 
Arab NGOs.1 Apart from the eye-catch-
ing example of the shared humanitar-
ian mission of the Red Cross / Red Cres-
cent Societies and the work of some 
ecumenical missions in the Holy Land, 
however, the large number of Islamic 
charities and think-tanks seem conspicuously absent from Western-
funded activities. Even before September 11 very rarely did religiously 
oriented Muslim organizations access international monies available 
for what donors call civil society organizations in the Arab world, al-
though Islamic NGOs provided medical care, education, welfare, emer-
gency relief, intellectual outlets, and other services throughout the 
region. With remarkably few exceptions, the overall pattern persisted 
into the twenty first century: among the many Arab NGOs that rely on 
foreign funding for at least some of their projects, few are grounded in 
Islam; and among the even larger number of Arab associations that are 
Islamic in their orientation, the proportion getting Western assistance 
for any of their programmes seems low.2 Why is this? Are the two kinds 
of humanitarian organizations so much at cross purposes that they can-
not cooperate, or are there institutional and po-
litical barriers as well? Here I speculate on several 
alternative explanations, or hypotheses, suggest-
ing, respectively, that donor prejudices, Arab or 
Islamist biases, hurdles imposed by Arab govern-
ments, institutional incompatibility between in-
ternational agencies and grassroots movements, 
alternative sources of hard currency for Muslim 
organizations, and/or restrictions imposed by the 
“war on terror” may discourage Islamic-Northern 
humanitarian liaisons. 
A clash of ideologies
First, perhaps Orientalist preconceptions and 
essentialist stereotypes are at work. One plausible 
hypothesis is that Western institutions are averse 
to associate with Islamic associations, even in the 
provision of welfare or emergency assistance; and, 
conversely, that donors seek like-minded part-
ners. After all, public opinion in Europe and the 
United States tends to take a dim view of Islam in 
general and (to the extent that the distinction is 
recognized) the Islamist movement in particular. 
Faith-based or values-driven Western NGOs, char-
ities, and development contractors, especially 
institutions with Christian or Christian democrat 
orientations, groups with Jewish constituencies, 
secular humanists, and feminists may refuse to collaborate with part-
ners whose values are or are assumed to be anathema to their own 
moral vocation. Short of pervasive Islamophobia, even a few naysayers 
among the staff, board of directors, or donor base of some agencies 
could be enough to dissuade the group from cooperating with Islam-
ists, or, indeed, any Muslim NGO on ethical grounds. European or North 
American women’s organizations whose undertaking is to fortify femi-
nine participation or rights protection in the public sphere might es-
chew solidarity with interlocutors whose central mission is to promote 
family welfare in the private sphere, even where the two sets of goals 
overlap in mother-child health care. Or Northern NGOs might consider 
embrace of family planning a litmus test for cooperation, or focus on 
campaigns against genital cutting or honour killings that define Islam 
as the culprit. Organizations dedicated specifically to serving Muslims 
may be disqualified by some secular Northern institutions on the nor-
mative grounds that services should be 
nonsectarian, while religiously orient-
ed humanitarian organizations based 
in Europe or North America may have 
traditionally worked in Latin America 
and Africa through churches and Chris-
tian charities. It is not surprising, for 
instance, that among Egypt’s many 
religious charities, the Coptic Evan-
gelical Organization for Social Services 
(CEOSS) and the Upper Egyptian Chris-
tian Association have historically been 
favoured by European and American over their Muslim counterparts. 
Ideological favouritism for “peace camp” Palestinians, capitalist solu-
tions, or buzz-words like civic, women’s, or human rights may further 
narrow eligibility by Islamic and popular organizations.
Self-righteous indignation cuts both ways, of course, along with 
demonization of the binary “other.” The second possibility is that 
Arab Islamist groups (or, for that matter, on the opposite end of the 
spectrum, progressive Arab organizations) might demure from as-
sociation with Western philanthropies and aid brokers on ideologi-
cal grounds of their own. Within the Muslim Middle East, the issue 
of foreign funding is divisive. Controversies rage about the ethics of 
“accepting dollars and euros,” and accusations are sometimes hurled 
at the liberal NGOs most dependent on external financing that they 
are stooges of Euro-American imperialism. Arab Islamist NGOs that 
define themselves in terms of the community of Muslims and indig-
enous cultural authenticity (or any group espousing the rights of the 
Palestinians, opposing the war in Iraq, or objecting to Crusaders and 
colonialists) might well be wary of the strings attached to collabo-
ration. Some activists find the ample quantities of technical advice 
and values training that accompany modest financial subsidies more 
vacuous than repugnant. Although by no means do all Arab NGOs 
decline, or even debate, foreign financing, plenty do, and nativism 
and Occidentalism run deepest among the neo-conservative Islam-
ist movement. Some West-baiting Islamist ideologues may be captive 
of their own xenophobic posturing against governments and organi-
zations that benefit from foreign largess, while others categorically 
reject secular humanism, Christian missionaries, feminist agendas, or 
Western hegemonic discourses. Some simply believe Muslims must 
help themselves, or rely on other Muslims. As among Northern associ-
ations, again even a vocal minority insisting it is simply wrong to part-
ner with the devil can squelch prospects for alliance. On both sides, 
it seems to me, some objections are simply obstreperous, whereas 
others are more substantive. 
Corporatist politics
The barriers to Western organizations’ cooperation with Islamic chari-
table NGOs may not be entirely, or even mainly, about a clash of ideolo-
gies, however. A third hypothesis is that Arab governments stymie such 
partnerships with bureaucratic red tape. The rulers of Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, and the Palestinian Authority all jeal-
ously guard access to the international donor monies that are their life-
blood through Byzantine regulations and a practice known as “corporat-
ism” whereby the state centralizes administration of associational life. 
Charities are required to register, often with a Ministry of Social Affairs, 
and often in a way that limits the range and scope of their programmes 
and fundraising activities. In addition, the Ministry or a National Con-
federation of some sort positions itself as an intermediary between in-
ternational aid agencies and local NGOs and attempts to capture the 
disbursement of foreign donations. Egypt’s corporatist strategies for 
monopolizing access to donor funds and at the same time outlawing 
activities connected to the Muslim Brotherhood are notoriously odi-
ous. Observers in Cairo and throughout the southern Mediterranean 
have described how governments create what are known as “clones” or 
GO-NGOs (government-organized non-governmental organizations, 
or the variant, RO-NGOs for royally-organized NGOs in Jordan and Mo-
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forced to close. 
Suspicions about elements of this transnational philanthropic network 
form the basis of a sixth hypothesis: that in prosecuting the “war on 
terror” and freezing channels of “terrorist financing” the United States 
and its allies have found ways to block flows of funds to any kind of Is-
lamic charity and warn organizations based in the North Atlantic away 
from even indirect contact with them. Gifts to alleviate Palestinian and 
southern Lebanese Shia refugees’ suffering seem to be mixed up with 
funding for Hamas and Hizbullah, and by the same logic many Islamic 
charities are somehow linked to a transnational Al-Qaida network. 
Osama bin Laden himself was quite the philanthropist in his day, after 
all. Thanks to massive U.S. efforts, the banking transactions or accounts 
of some Islamic charities have been jammed, others are under investi-
gation, and all are tainted by some level of suspicion. This is bound to 
have a chilling effect on international donations to Arab, and especially 
Muslim, charities. Fear of being discovered in any partnership tainted 
by an affiliation deemed to be sympathetic to Islamist militants could 
likewise affect the thinking of European and North American founda-
tions, aid agencies, and development professionals about whether 
and how to liaise with faith-based organizations in the Muslim world. 
Perhaps, even, the many professional development and humanitarian 
organization staff working in Arab countries who had recognized and 
studied steps to alleviating the clearly anti-Islamic bias in their funding 
patterns before the turn of the millennium will have put those plans on 
hold for fear of being caught up in the dragnet. This brings us nearly full 
circle. There’s an element of naked Islam-bashing in the war on terror, 
to be sure, yet by the same token, like all conspiracy theories, including 
Arab perceptions of a Western war on Muslim institutions, it draws on 
at least some empirical evidence. 
The gap between the good scholarship on Islamic associations and 
the equally large body of research on donor financing of NGOs in the 
Arab world is itself evidence of the scarcity of examples of both. Per-
haps explaining the null set of Western-Islamic humanitarian coopera-
tion is like analyzing why strange bedfellows do 
not mate. Most likely, different but mutually rein-
forcing ideological, institutional, and geo-political 
factors operate in various local and national con-
texts, amidst fluctuations and swirls of globally 
travelling anxieties and preoccupations, until the 
very idea of misogynist ventures becomes virtu-
ally unimaginable, or terribly risqué. 
rocco) in order to appropriate donor funds earmarked for 
NGOs and, just as importantly, to represent their countries 
at international NGO conferences. Since the principle rivals 
to ruling establishments across the Arab world come from 
the Islamist current, it is not improbable that governments 
reroute donor funds to their own acolytes. 
Alternately, perhaps transnational organizations’ own bu-
reaucratic procedures favour certain kinds of counterparts. 
Large transnational funding agencies’ intricate guidelines 
for book-keeping, the legal liability of boards of directors, 
the submission of bids or proposals, the credentials of those 
offering the service, and other matters might not pose im-
pediments to the large urban Islamic NGOs of the twenty 
first century but certainly did rule out partnership for many 
loosely-run groups in Yemen, Palestine, and rural villages 
elsewhere as late as the nineteen nineties. For all the osten-
sible effort in assisting the downtrodden, a requirement for 
Excel spreadsheets can put foreign finance out of the reach 
of barefoot or ad-hoc community self-help even today. It is 
not only that international donors’ favourite Egyptian part-
ner, CEOSS, was a Coptic charity, this hypothesis suggests, 
but also that it was a professionally-run organization with a 
full-time accountant, a good filing system, and a staff fluent 
in English and French. Arab NGOs that successfully compete for grants 
and contracts from complex transnational organizations most closely 
approximate the form, substance, institutional culture, and business 
attire of their patrons. Different organizations may not match the defi-
nitions of “NGO” or “women’s group” established by administrators in 
Brussels, Amsterdam, Washington, or New York; registering with the 
United Nations to attend international conferences is no mean feat, 
for instance. Indeed, there are plenty of times when European, North 
American, and UN agencies sponsor new NGOs with complimentary 
organizational structure, accountancy methods, and declarations of 
purpose rather than deal with existing potential partners’ idiosyncra-
sies. In some instances, this counter-corporatist policy is explicitly de-
signed to get around Arab or Israeli government restrictions, whereas 
in others it is an administrative directive. “Donor-organized” NGOs, in-
cluding franchises of Western-based organizations and self-standing 
local enterprises, are dubbed DO-NGOs, and occasionally BYO-NGOs 
for “bring-your-own-NGO.” (The popular press in both Arabic and 
English sometimes calls them “fronts.”) Under this hypothesis it is not 
outside the realm of possibility that international donors and develop-
ment brokers would clone Islamic counterparts to replicate their own 
structures and procedures. 
Transnational financial networks
In addition to ideology and bureaucratic corporatism, there are at 
least two other possible explanations for a disjuncture between West-
ern and Muslim humanitarian and welfare projects. The fifth hypoth-
esis is that Muslim NGOs, whether welfare societies, private charities, 
or think-tanks, do not really need dollars and euros because alterna-
tive sources of philanthropy for Arab and Islamic causes are available 
in riyals. Specifically, both public coffers and private financiers in the 
oil-rich Persian Gulf region have supported Islamic hospitals, schools, 
and charities in the more poverty-stricken and war-ravaged parts of 
the Arab region. The Saudi and sometimes the Iranian government 
bank-rolled mosque construction across the region and the globe, and 
all the Arab kingdoms of the Gulf have generous official aid packages 
with a strong welfare component (and, probably, by the logic of hy-
pothesis 4, above, their own ideological and organizational criteria for 
partnership). Individual millionaires in the Gulf, including Gulf princes, 
princesses, and citizens as well as expatriate Arab migrants, presum-
ably tithe a portion of their fortunes to needy Muslims. Migrants in the 
West also send remittances to mosque-based associations back home. 
Individuals and families have established charitable foundations. Small 
and large personal contributions peak in Ramadan; massive fundrais-
ing drives are held at moments of greatest catastrophe, as when bombs 
are pummelling Lebanese slums or bulldozers demolishing Palestinian 
homes, or during the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is almost con-
descending to add that the Arab Muslim world has a rich tradition of 
philanthropic giving in the form of waqf foundations, zakat tithes, and 
sadaqa donations, and that beneficent impulses are equally common 
among Muslims, Christians, and Jews. 
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